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Abstract 
Financial safety nets in Asia have come a long way since the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of 
1997/98. Not wanting to rely solely on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) again, the Chiang 
Mai Initiative (CMI) was created in 2000. When the CMI also proved inadequate following the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC), it was first multilateralized (CMIM), and then doubled in size to 
US$240 billion, while the IMF de-linked portion was increased to 30% of the available country 
quotas. A surveillance unit, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)+3 
Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), was set-up in 2011. These are impressive 
developments, but are they enough to make the CMIM workable? Without clear and rapid-
response procedures to handle a fast-developing financial emergency, we argue it is unlikely 
that the CMIM will be used even as a complement to the IMF. To serve as a stand-alone option, 
however, its size or the IMF de-linked portion of funds needs to be further increased, as does its 
membership to add diversity. Only if AMRO can develop into an independent and credible 
surveillance authority, would it then perhaps be in a position to lead the next rescue.  
 
Keywords: regional financial safety nets; Chiang Mai Initiative; ASEAN+3; Asia; Asian Monetary 
Fund; IMF 
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Financial Safety Nets in Asia: Genesis, Evolution, Adequacy, and Way Forward 
 
1. Introduction 
The impetus for strengthening regional financial safety nets among members of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) came following the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of 
1997/98. Although there was an existing insurance mechanism in the form of the ASEAN Swap 
Arrangement (ASA)—which had been used a couple of times in the early 1990s, although not 
really in a crisis context—the ASA proved miserably inadequate in the face of the huge amounts 
of financing required by countries affected by the AFC. Despite pledges of external support from 
other countries in the region, the AFC-affected countries were eventually forced to turn to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for the massive bailouts required. With the resentment that 
derived from the bitter medicine prescribed, a decision was taken to pursue a regional safety net 
that could provide a real alternative. The initial step was taken with the creation of the Chiang 
Mai Initiative (CMI) in 2000, which expanded the bilateral swaps of the ASA, both in size and 
membership, to include three additional members: the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
Japan, and the Republic of Korea. The CMI’s first major test came in September 2008 when, 
following the Lehman Brothers collapse, short-term capital quickly exited emerging economies. 
Members of the CMI that required liquidity support did not turn to it, but instead rushed to secure 
bilateral swaps with and support from the US, PRC, Japan, Australia, regional development 
banks, and multilaterals.  
 
Once again, the regional financial safety net had failed its members. This brought about another 
significant change when, in 2009, the CMI was multilateralized to become the CMIM, with the 
many swap lines now governed by a single agreement. This was soon followed by a number of 
other important changes, including the doubling of its size to US$240 billion, increasing the 
share available without an IMF program to 30% and the setting up of an independent 
surveillance unit, the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), in 2011. These are 
impressive developments, but are they enough to ensure that the CMIM will be called upon 
when the next crisis strikes? This is the key question that this paper attempts to answer. And if 
they are not sufficient, what are the issues that still need to be addressed to make the CMIM 
viable, either as a co-financing facility with the IMF or as a stand-alone alternative? 
 
The remainder of the paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 looks at history and traces the 
evolution of the ASA from its early beginnings to the CMI and its expansion. In Section 3, we 
describe the basic structure and features of the CMIM and the AMRO. Some of the most 
significant modifications to the CMIM have taken place recently, in the aftermath of the GFC, 
and these are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 addresses the key question of whether these 
changes are sufficient to make the CMIM operationally viable. Since we argue that it is still 
unlikely to be used during a crisis, we canvass areas that need to be reformed, separating what 
is needed for it to work as a complement to the IMF from what more needs to be done for it to 
serve as a real alternative. A final section concludes.  
 
2. Early Beginnings: from the ASA to the CMI and its Expansion 
Although the impetus for strengthening regional financial safety nets among ASEAN countries 
was generated by the AFC of 1997/98, they have an even longer history than is often 
recognized. Going back more than 3 decades to August 1977, the first step toward establishing 
a regional financial safety net was taken when the central banks and monetary authorities of the 
original five members of ASEAN—Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—
agreed to establish reciprocal currency, or swap, arrangements. The ASEAN Swap 
Arrangement (ASA) was created primarily to provide liquidity support for those countries 
experiencing balance of payments difficulties. Originally intended to be in effect for just 1 year, 
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the arrangement has been extended incrementally, while coverage and the amounts involved 
have expanded significantly. The initial maximum total amount available for swap transactions 
under the ASA was a meager US$100 million, with the maximum total outstanding amount 
provided by each participant limited to US$20 million, but was subsequently increased to 
US$200 million in 1978. These were swaps among central banks and did not involve a linkage 
with the IMF. 
 
Nothing much happened with the ASA for the next 2 decades and when the AFC struck, the 
amounts available were nowhere near adequate. No attempts were therefore made to use the 
ASA at this time. In 1998, the Japanese government proposed an alternative “Asian Monetary 
Fund,” but neglecting to consult the PRC first, there was insufficient regional support to counter 
the predictable opposition from the United States (US). With no other alternative, three of the 
four crisis-affected countries—Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand—had to accept 
an IMF program, the quid pro quo for international support; the fourth, Malaysia, went it alone. 
The IMF grew extremely unpopular, not just for the prescribed bitter medicine, but that it 
misdiagnosed the problems—a fact that it later acknowledged.  
 
Discontent with the way in which the IMF managed the rescue programs led to a resurgence of 
nationalist sentiment that quickly grew regional. The AFC highlighted the need to revisit the 
issue to see what needed to be done in order to have an effective regional insurance scheme. 
The first step toward establishing such a scheme was taken soon after in May 2000 with the 
launch of the CMI, announced at the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers’ Meeting (AFMM+3) in the 
Thai city after which it is named. 
 
The CMI consisted of two components. The first was an expanded ASA, which covered all (by 
now 10) ASEAN member countries. In November 2000, the total amount available for swap 
transactions under the expanded ASA was increased from US$200 million to US$1 billion.  
 
The second component was a network of bilateral swap agreements (BSAs) between the 
ASEAN countries and the “Plus Three” countries: the PRC, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. 
These BSAs were initiated in 2002 and grew from a total of US$17 billion at their inception to 
US$31.5 billion in 2003 and US$36.4 billion in 2004.  
 
In May 2005, during the 8th AFMM+3, the amount of the expanded ASA was doubled from 
US$1 billion to US$2 billion. But the action continued to center around the BSAs between 
ASEAN countries and the Plus Three countries, rather than the expanded ASA. The number of 
BSAs and the amounts involved continued to grow over time. By the time of the AFMM+3 in 
Madrid in May 2008, the size of the BSAs had increased to US$84 billion (Table 1). 
 
                                            (Table 1 about here). 
  
3. CMIM and AMRO: Basic Structure and Salient Features 
If the AFC lit the fuse for the need to transform the ASA into the CMI, then the GFC of 2008 
highlighted the continued shortcomings of that transformation. As with the AFC, the regional 
safety net was inadequate when the GFC hit. Given the CMI’s small size and absence of rapid-
response mechanisms, affected countries resorted to bilateral swaps with and support from the 
US, Japan, Australia, and regional agencies. The meetings of the AFMM+3 that followed agreed 
to radically transform the CMI in several ways. First, the finance ministers decided to expedite 
the multilateralization of the CMI. They agreed that funds available under the CMIM should be a 
self-managed reserve pooling arrangement, governed by a single contract, reducing costly and 
wasteful duplication. The finance ministers also confirmed that the proportion of the 
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contributions from ASEAN and the Plus Three countries to the CMI would be 20% for ASEAN, 
and 80% collectively for the PRC, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. Japan and the PRC2
 
 would 
contribute identical shares of the total reserve pool (32%), which was double the Republic of 
Korea's share. Second, they agreed to further expand the pool of foreign currency reserves. 
The size of the fund thus grew from US$36.5 billion in 2001–05, to US$84 billion in 2008, and to 
US$120 billion in May 2009. The CMIM formally came into effect on 24 March 2010. 
3.1 CMIM 
The CMIM operates as a common US dollar liquidity pool: a member state can swap its local 
currency for US dollars from this pool in the event of a balance of payments or liquidity crisis. As 
a self-managed reserve pooling system, contributions remain in the individual central banks of 
member countries and are not actually paid into a common or centralized fund. The availability 
of CMIM funds to a particular member country is limited by its borrowing quota (Table 2). The 
maximum amount that each country can borrow is based on its contribution multiplied by its 
respective borrowing multiplier. The multiplier coefficient of the CMIM’s borrowing quotas is 
designed to favor the smaller ASEAN economies. The borrowing multiplier for Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Myanmar, and Viet 
Nam is therefore set at 5. Among the rest, the borrowing multiplier is set at 2.5 for Hong Kong, 
China; Indonesia; Malaysia; the Philippines; Singapore; and Thailand; 1 for the Republic of 
Korea; and 0.5 for Japan and the PRC.  
 
                                            (Table 2 about here). 
 
A country that requests to draw funds has to meet conditions before the voting for a swap 
request. These include a completed review of the economic and financial situation, compliance 
with covenants, such as submission of a periodic surveillance report, and participation in the 
ASEAN+3 Economic Review and Policy Dialogue (ERPD) process. These are hardly stringent 
conditions, and should not pose a problem for most, if not all, of the member countries. It is not 
the stringency of the requirements that is a problem, but rather the time involved. For instance, it 
is unclear how long a review of the economic and financial situation will take to complete, but it 
is unlikely to be quick, certainly relative to the speed of response frequently required during a 
financial emergency. In addition to these potentially time consuming requirements, the actual 
activation procedures may entail an additional 2 weeks.  
 
To access the CMIM, a member country must submit a request to the Coordinating Countries, 
i.e., the two co-chairs of the ASEAN+3 Finance Minister Process (one from ASEAN and the 
other from the Plus Three countries). The Coordinating Countries deliver the swap request 
notice and other relevant information to the Executive Level Decision-Making Body (ELDMB), a 
non-resident body composed of deputy level representatives from ASEAN+3 finance ministries 
and central banks, and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA). They then need to convene 
a meeting to decide on the swap request. The ELDMB must respond to the swap request within 
2 weeks of receipt of the swap request notice. Decisions on drawings are made by a two-thirds 
majority (weighted voting system linked to contributions) of the ELDMB, meaning that the Plus 
Three countries do not individually have veto power. Once the request is approved, the swap 
providing countries transfer the funds to the account of the swap requesting party, which in turn 
transfers the equivalent amount in local currencies to the accounts of swap providing countries 
(AMRO 2012, BSP 2012, and ASEAN Secretariat 2010). 
 
                                               
2 Includes the contribution from Hong Kong, China.  
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In comparison with other regional safety nets, Henning (2004, p. 61) concluded that “…the 
Chiang Mai Initiative is more sensitive to preserving the central position of the IMF and not 
undercutting the IMF in negotiations with borrowing countries than these other arrangements.” 
Although there have been changes since that observation, the central role of the IMF remains. 
Until recently, a country could draw up to 20% of its quota without needing to have an IMF 
arrangement or being subject to IMF conditionality. Should a country avail of its full quota, the 
remainder of the amount to be disbursed would be tied to an IMF program. Presumably this link 
was intended to help protect the funds in the CMIM, address moral hazard issues, and make up 
for the lack of an independent surveillance unit that could oversee the CMI’s operations. The 
eventual establishment of AMRO in 2011 has led to a reconsideration of this link, which we now 
examine. 
 
3.2 AMRO 
During its May 2009 meeting in Bali, the AFMM+3 agreed to establish an ancillary institution in 
the form of an independent regional surveillance unit. AMRO was incorporated on 20 April 2011 
as a company limited by guarantee under the Companies Act, Cap. 50, of the Republic of 
Singapore. It commenced operations 1 month later in May 2011.  
 
The need for an independent surveillance unit was predicated on the multilateralization of the 
CMI. In a multilateralized setting, monitoring and surveillance had to be enhanced to detect 
emerging vulnerabilities. CMIM decision-making also had to be supported by an independent 
unit with a due diligence function, so that the borrowing countries’ capacity to meet the 
repayment conditions of lending countries could be assessed. Unconditional financing when 
there is a need for policy correction could create moral hazard, both for potential borrowers and 
for international investors, even when it does not adversely affect the prospect for timely 
repayment. 
 
AMRO’s activities are divided into functions during so-called “peace time” and “crisis time.”  
During peace (non-crisis) periods, AMRO’s main responsibility is to prepare quarterly 
consolidated reports on the overall macroeconomic assessment of the ASEAN+3 region, as well 
as on individual ASEAN+3 countries. Should a crisis occur, however, its role and responsibilities 
multiply. During crisis time, AMRO is tasked to (i) provide an analysis of the economic and 
financial situation of the CMIM Swap Requesting Country, (ii) monitor the use and impact of the 
funds disbursed under the CMIM Agreement, and (iii) monitor the compliance of the CMIM 
Swap Requesting Country with any lending covenants to the CMIM Agreement. 
 
AMRO is governed by an Executive Committee (EC) comprising deputy finance ministers and 
deputy central bank governors of member countries. The EC oversees AMRO and is 
responsible for providing guidance, setting broad policy direction for the management of AMRO, 
and appointing the AMRO Director and Advisory Panel members. An Advisory Panel consisting 
of six members provides strategic, technical, and professional guidance to AMRO. The panel is 
independent from the Director and staff of AMRO, and is accountable to the EC.  
 
At present, AMRO is being run by a small complement of 12 professional staff, led by the 
AMRO Director. There are plans to expand the complement of professional staff to 16 in the 
near future. Since its establishment in 2011, AMRO has initiated a secondment scheme, and 
created linkages with international financial institutions and various authorities in CMIM member 
countries. AMRO has also conducted a number of surveillance visits in the region, and 
presented Economic Review and Policy Dialogue reports at recent ASEAN+3 Finance and 
Central Bank Deputies Meetings. 
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4. Post-CMIM Developments 
The ongoing uncertainty over the recovery in the US and the continuing crisis in the eurozone 
has highlighted the need to further strengthen the CMIM’s capacity to act as a regional financial 
safety net (Azis 2012). To address this need, the 15th Meeting of ASEAN+3, held on the 
sidelines of the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) Annual Meeting in Manila in May 2012, 
agreed to (i) double the total size of the CMIM from US$120 billion to US$240 billion; (ii) 
increase the IMF de-linked portion to 30% in 2012, with a view to increasing it to 40% in 2014, 
subject to review should conditions warrant; and (c) introduce a crisis prevention facility.   
 
These three outcomes were the key decisions announced at this meeting. Another change of an 
institutional nature that occurred was the upgrading of the AFMM+3 to the ASEAN+3 Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors’ Meeting. That is, for the first time, the central bank 
governors of the 13 member countries and the head of HKMA were invited to participate in this 
forum. This is an important development in that it brings together officials responsible for tax 
and expenditure programs with those handling monetary and exchange rate policies. The crisis 
prevention facility was introduced in response to calls for an ex ante liquidity support facility 
similar to those of the IMF—the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) and the Precautionary Credit Line 
(PCL)—introduced in the wake of the GFC.3
 
   
As such, the CMIM will now have two separate instruments: a short-term liquidity support facility 
to address sudden but temporary liquidity shortages, and a crisis resolution facility to address 
more medium-term liquidity and structural problems. The crisis prevention mechanism will be 
called the CMIM Precautionary Line (CMIM-PL), while the crisis resolution mechanism will be 
called the CMIM Stability Facility (CMIM-SF). To be able to access the CMIM-PL, the requesting 
country must meet the following criteria as ex ante qualifications and ex post conditionality: 
(i) external position and market access, (ii) fiscal policy, (iii) monetary policy, (iv) financial sector 
soundness and supervision, and (v) data adequacy.4
   
 
The total amount that can be drawn by each member country, either for prevention or resolution 
purposes, shall be within the maximum swap amount set aside for that country. Dual-drawing 
from both CMIM-SF and CMIM-PL shall be restricted, with the CMIM-SF replacing the CMIM-PL 
if the recipient party is hit by a crisis and needs additional support. For the CMIM-PL, the 
duration of access is 6 months (with three renewals allowed), totaling 2 years in arrangement 
period. Maturity is at 6 months for the IMF de-linked portion, and 1 year for the IMF-linked 
portion. Monitoring will be conducted on a bi-annual basis. Access to the CMIM-PL requires a 
commitment fee of 0.15%. For the CMIM-SF, the maturity of the IMF de-linked portion is set at 
6 months (with three renewals allowed), totaling up to 2 years in the supporting period. Maturity 
of the IMF-linked portion is set at 1 year with 2 renewals possible, totaling up to 3 years in 
supporting period. As with the CMIM-PL, monitoring is also to be conducted on a bi-annual 
basis.5
 
 Borrowing is charged at the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) rate plus a 
premium. 
5. The Way Forward: Filling in the Remaining Gaps in the Regional Safety Net 
The agreements reached at the recently concluded 15th Meeting of ASEAN+3 Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors represent a significant step toward transforming the 
                                               
3 The ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers had already commented on the desirability of such a facility at their 2011 Ha Noi 
meeting, noting that “…we instructed the Deputies to initiate a study on the design of a possible crisis prevention 
function for CMIM, including the size, further collaboration with the IMF, and the role of AMRO.” 
4 The Joint Statement of the 15th ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting. 2012. 3 May, 
Manila, Philippines. 
5 Ibid. 
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CMIM into a more credible regional financial safety net. Nevertheless, the key question remains 
as to whether these changes, however significant, are actually sufficient to make the CMIM an 
option that members are likely to use in the event of a liquidity crisis. And as of now, it only 
makes sense to think of the CMIM as catering to a liquidity crisis, and not the more common 
deep fiscal crisis requiring a structural adjustment program. So, the question is, have these 
changes made the CMIM useable to counter a liquidity crisis? And if so, useable in what way? 
There are two options that are relevant in this context. At the moment, the CMIM is set-up to act 
as a co-financing mechanism with the IMF. This is not to downplay its role but rather to 
recognize that the bulk of its resources are tied to an IMF program. From Table 3, which 
describes and compares the salient features of the other regional financial mechanisms that 
exist around the world, we can see that most also operate in a somewhat similar fashion. This is 
the first and current prospect option. The other option is for the scheme to operate as an 
independent mechanism, serving as an alternative to the IMF. It is worth noting that acting as an 
alternative in this context does not necessarily mean excluding any role for the IMF, but rather 
one where the CMIM plays the lead or dominant role.  
 
 
                                            (Table 3 about here). 
 
Despite the significant changes made, it appears that the CMIM, as it currently stands, can do 
neither. In its current configuration, it is unlikely that the regional safety net will be called upon at 
all, as evidenced by the fact that it has never been used despite the need for liquidity by several 
members during the GFC. At the moment, it is neither a complement nor an alternative to the 
IMF. We now examine what is required in terms of operationalizing each of these two options.   
 
For the CMIM to serve its immediate function as a complement to the IMF, a number of issues 
relating to operating procedures need to be resolved. Fixing these procedural problems is also 
necessary—but not sufficient—for making it viable as an alternative to the IMF. For it to evolve 
into an alternative to the IMF, some longer-term issues relating to size, membership, and 
surveillance capacity need consideration as well. 
 
5.1 CMIM as a Complement to the IMF 
Irrespective of whether the CMIM is to be a complement or an alternative to the IMF, it needs to 
urgently address the speed and efficiency with which requests for assistance can be activated. 
As noted earlier, a request for emergency support could take up to 2 weeks to process. There is 
also some uncertainty over the steps involved and precise information to be provided, among 
other concerns (Azis 2012). Part of the problem lies with the fact that the CMIM is not a fund but 
rather a reserve pooling system whereby country contributions remain with the respective 
central banks or monetary authority. The fact that the decision also rests with a high-level, non-
resident body further increases the likelihood of delay. The EC as the decision-making body, 
after all, comprises deputy finance ministers and deputy central bank governors of member 
countries. 
 
The real competitor to the CMIM–IMF option is bilateral swaps, and other similar standby 
arrangements. These are not only quick-disbursing, but also come without explicit 
conditionalities as they are adequately collateralized in most cases. Although the introduction of 
the CMIM-PL was supposed to help improve the flexibility and timeliness of liquidity support to 
address short-term liquidity problems, the procedural issues mentioned earlier, combined with 
its continued linkage to an IMF program, may very well undermine its actual usefulness. As 
noted earlier, countries have been reluctant to apply for financing under the IMF’s own crisis 
prevention facilities for fear of adverse signaling effects (Pickford 2011). 
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It has been suggested that linkage to a standard IMF program should not be required in the 
case of temporary, short-term liquidity problems. Sussangkarn (2011) argues that an IMF 
program should only be invoked if a country needs to roll over the swap more than a certain 
predetermined number of times, with the IMF joining the battle only if the situation becomes a 
more medium-term structural problem. Under the CMIM’s current arrangements, this would 
mean that the linkage would only apply to financing under the CMIM-SF. By not invoking an IMF 
link immediately, countries with temporary liquidity problems will be more willing to use the 
CMIM if they feel that the funds would be available without delay. At the same time, knowing 
that an IMF link will be required after a certain period will encourage the country to take 
appropriate corrective actions to avoid having to be under an IMF program. This could go a long 
way toward making the CMIM–IMF option viable as a liquidity support mechanism. But the 
largest contributors, Japan and the PRC, who are in essence “creditors” because they can 
withdraw less than what they have put in (i.e., a multiplier of 0.5), must feel that their 
contributions are secure under such an arrangement. With AMRO still in its infancy, it is likely 
that they will continue to seek cover from IMF involvement to ensure that their funds are 
safeguarded, even when used for short-term liquidity support. 
 
5.2 CMIM as an Alternative to the IMF 
Next we turn to the viability of the CMIM as a stand-alone option, or one without IMF 
involvement.  At present, this applies only if a country does not exceed 30% of its quota. There 
are basically three outstanding issues that need to be addressed in order to further strengthen 
the viability of this option. These relate to size, membership, and surveillance capacity. Although 
all of these reforms are desirable, they are not equally important. Some are complementary, 
such as the size of the fund and country membership, while building up the surveillance 
capacity and credibility of AMRO could make the small size and membership of the CMIM less 
binding constraints. 
 
The ongoing crisis in the eurozone is a potent reminder of the massive amounts of financing 
required to stem a systemic liquidity crisis. Although the eurozone crisis has its roots in fiscal 
insolvency, the point remains that the sums involved in a bailout for any kind of regional crisis 
that spreads across countries is likely to be massive. Although the CMIM’s size has been 
increased substantially since 2008 to currently stand at US$240 billion, it is unlikely to be 
sufficient if there is a full-blown systemic crisis in East Asia, especially if it spreads across 
several members. During the AFC, Thailand received over US$17 billion in emergency liquidity. 
Yet, Thailand (and the four other original ASEAN members) can access only a fraction of this 
amount, about US$7 billion in 2012 US dollars, from the CMIM without an IMF program. 
Indonesia received almost six times (US$40 billion) the amount of its de-linked portion of the 
CMIM, or an even greater multiple if converted into today’s dollars. The Republic of Korea was 
the other crisis-hit country that availed of an IMF-led program and bilateral support that totaled 
US$57 billion, while today its full quota with the CMIM is about US$38 billion. 
Further Increasing the Size of the CMIM  
 
For the CMIM to be a viable stand-alone option, either the size of the overall fund or the 
percentage of the de-linked portion needs to be increased substantially before it is attractive to 
the five original ASEAN members. These countries have bilateral swaps that they are more 
likely to call upon should a crisis hit, as recent experience has shown. From Table 4, we can 
see that the Philippines has bilateral swaps with the PRC, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. 
Indonesia has them with the PRC and Japan; Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia each have 
swaps with the PRC. These are the ones that are currently in force, but there are more that are 
up for renegotiation, as listed in Table 5. If national reserves are the first line of defense in the 
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event of a liquidity crisis, then bilateral swaps are designed to supplement them. But these 
bilateral swaps themselves might be insurance against a regional insurance scheme like the 
CMIM when it is perceived to be unusable.  
 
                                            (Table 4 about here). 
 
                                            (Table 5 about here). 
 
It is apparent that the CMIM was never intended for use by the Republic of Korea or its two 
largest contributors, the PRC and Japan. This point has been reinforced by the bilateral swaps 
between these three countries announced virtually in tandem with the doubling of the CMIM. 
The Plus Three countries have also agreed to promote investment by their respective foreign 
reserve authorities in one another’s government bonds. 
 
So if the CMIM was never intended for use by its largest contributors, and if the country quotas 
of the original five ASEAN countries are insufficient when judged by the experience of the AFC, 
could the CMIM still be used by ASEAN’s newer, smaller members? After all, for these 
countries, their full quotas are a quite substantial share of their individual reserves (Table 6). 
Nevertheless, they may still be insufficient for a bailout. For example, Cambodia’s contribution 
of US$240 million enables it to borrow up to five times that amount, but it can only borrow 
US$360 million if it wants to avoid signing on to an IMF program. As of February 2012, 
Cambodia’s total reserves (less gold) stood at US$3.64 billion, which is just more than three 
times its borrowing limit with the CMIM. Should a crisis strike, and given the small size of 
Cambodia’s country quota as a share of its reserves, Cambodia could either rely on its own 
reserves or would need to go beyond the CMIM, depending on the severity of the crisis. The 
same is likely to be true of the other new members of ASEAN. 
 
                                            (Table 6 about here). 
 
But the smaller, poorer countries of ASEAN—Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Viet Nam 
(CLMV)—face another potential risk by being part of the CMIM. To illustrate, consider a 
situation where some other country faces a liquidity crisis and decides that it will call upon the 
CMIM for at least part of its emergency funding needs. If this happens, then the CLMV, like 
other members except the requesting country, will be called upon to contribute their share of the 
rescue package (the “Contribution” column in Table 2). As noted above, the contributions of the 
CLMV as a share of their respective national reserves is significant, and we could have a 
situation where the poorest countries are assisting in bailing out a much richer country. If the 
requesting country is afflicted by a crisis that is not purely domestic or of its own making, then 
the possibility of contagion raises the vulnerability of other countries, and further increases the 
cost of having to contribute to its bailout. We have seen this happen during the eurozone crisis 
when Slovakia contributed to Greece’s bailout package, even though it is a much poorer 
country. The CMIM agreement does provide for an opt-out or escape clause; this would require 
either the approval of the EC or the existence of highly extenuating circumstances.6
 
 If one or 
more countries start opting out, and if this leads to a domino or snowballing effect, then the 
CMIM will simply fail to deliver. The associated loss of credibility may be irreversible.  
                                               
6 The escape clause states: “In principle, each of the CMIM parties may only escape from contributing to 
a swap request by obtaining an approval of Executive Level Decision-Making Body. In exceptional 
cases such as an extraordinary event or instance of force majeure and domestic legal limitations, 
escape is possible without obtaining ELDMB approval.” 
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It has been suggested that member countries may have to move away from self-insurance in 
the form of holding large foreign reserves, and start shifting funds toward the CMIM. Apart from 
further increasing member country’s contributions to the CMIM, Sussangkarn (2011) also 
proposes attaching additional bilateral swaps from willing member countries to a CMIM swap. 
Although this is an interesting proposal, the question as to why bilateral swaps are being 
pursued in tandem with the CMIM needs to be answered first. If it is to circumvent the 
procedural difficulties and associated delays, then these issues need to be addressed before 
any such linkage is likely to be possible. As noted earlier, it may well be the case that these 
bilateral swaps are being pursued as an alternative defense mechanism to the CMIM and 
therefore attaching them to the CMIM is either unlikely to be favored, if CMIM procedures apply, 
or purely cosmetic, if they do not.  
 
If this is indeed the case with the CMIM, then even the seemingly innocuous statement by 
Takehiko Nakao, Japan’s Vice Finance Minister for International Affairs, that “having this kind of 
mechanism is better than having nothing,” may have been more than just generous, but also 
possibly wrong.7
 
 If the CMIM is unusable for one or more members, it can actually reduce the 
capacity of these members to stave off a liquidity crisis by reducing their uncommitted national 
reserves, which is a country’s first line of defense. How can an unusable CMIM increase the 
vulnerability of members to crisis? Consider what happened during the GFC. As noted, 
Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore were forced to pursue bilateral swaps when 
capital started rapidly exiting their economies. The fact that they had to pursue this option itself 
suggests that national reserves were considered insufficient in the sense that a country would 
not want to completely or even severely deplete its reserves during a crisis whose full 
magnitude is still unknown. In times of potential or impending crisis, perceptions matter even 
more—a view underlined by the fact that bilateral swaps are often negotiated before, rather than 
during or after, a liquidity shortfall. At the margin, however, it could be that the commitment that 
a country without plentiful reserves, like Indonesia for instance, had made to the CMIM could 
have made the difference in terms of such perceptions of sufficiency. The problem only grows in 
magnitude as the CMIM expands in size but continues to be unusable, for whatever reason. But 
the effects will vary by country, depending on how abundant their reserves are to begin with. 
Again, the smaller, poorer countries will be most at risk, while the bigger, richer ones will be 
least affected. 
Members also cannot operate by ignoring the amount of their reserves committed or promised 
to the CMIM, or the system will break down. For instance, consider again the case of the CLMV. 
Since these are countries without the ability to secure a bilateral swap, given the low collateral 
value of their domestically issued currencies, they may have to resort to the CMIM (and\or the 
IMF) in times of crisis. If other members fear they may face a liquidity crisis that they are unable 
to manage, and therefore ignore their commitments, then there is a real possibility that the 
CMIM may not be able to deliver on one or more requests from the CLMV. As with a domino 
effect with opt-out requests, this too would likely mark the end of the CMIM, both in theory and 
in practice. 
 
It also remains to be seen whether the recent increase in bilateral currency swap arrangements 
among the Plus Three countries will be extended to other CMIM members to bolster existing 
swap lines with these countries.  And even if they did, it is unclear if the Plus Three countries 
                                               
7 Quoted in A. Rowley, S. Verma, and M. Townsend. 2012. New Fund Seen as Asia’s Own IMF. Emerging 
Markets 4 May. Available at http://www.emergingmarkets.org/Article/3023530/New-fund-seen-as-Asias-
own-IMF.html?LS=EMS648101 
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would be amenable to managing these bilateral swaps under the same conditions as the CMIM 
swap, unless of course they didn’t want them to be used. 
 
The IMF has already raised the possibility of establishing a Multi-Country Swap Line (MSL) 
mechanism that would enable it to offer liquidity lines to a limited set of countries with sound 
policies and track records (IMF 2010b). This would form part of a broader Global Stabilization 
Mechanism (GSM), a framework that would allow the proactive provision of financing during a 
systemic crisis to stem contagion. The GSM also envisions a multipolar liquidity safety network, 
involving national monetary authorities and regional RFMs, with the IMF at the center (Menon 
and Morgan 2011). The establishment of such a mechanism, and its involvement with the 
CMIM, would provide more avenues for increasing the size of liquidity support available to the 
region beyond the CMIM pool. Even this option for expansion, however, is contingent on the 
CMIM cleaning up and streamlining its operational procedures. 
 
If the CMIM is to become a stand-alone option, or if it is to evolve into an Asian Monetary Fund-
type institution some day, then the issue of membership needs to be considered. Expanding the 
membership of the CMIM has less to do with potentially increasing the size of the fund than it 
does diversifying it. More than just increasing membership, there is a need to broaden it to 
include countries that are less directly or immediately connected to East Asian business cycles. 
This would increase the ability of the fund to cater to the liquidity needs of a clutch of countries 
requiring support in the event of a contagious crisis if a sufficient number of contributors were 
unaffected by it. There is no denying that the process of trying to expand membership is likely to 
be a complicated and sensitive one. However difficult, there is a need to start the discussion if 
the CMIM is to survive and prosper as a viable financial safety net, let alone evolve into a 
de facto Asian Monetary Fund.  
Expanding the Membership of the CMIM 
 
The obvious candidates for the first enlargement would be those originally joining ASEAN+3 in 
the East Asian Summit: Australia, New Zealand, and India. India already has a BSA with Japan, 
while Australia is a contributor to the recent standby arrangement with Indonesia, which is 
managed by ADB. Although this expansion makes sense regionally, it is unlikely to diversify the 
CMIM to any significant extent given that Australia’s economic fortunes are very closely linked 
to the PRC’s, and India’s are increasingly becoming so. Even New Zealand’s economic fortunes 
are indirectly linked through its strong ties to Australia, and growing ties with the PRC. But the 
larger the number of contributing members, the greater the likelihood that some will be largely 
immune from a contagious regional crisis. This is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that 
Australia was the only advanced country that did not undergo a recession when the GFC hit. 
Like any risk diversification exercise, the number usually matters.  
 
Candidates for any subsequent enlargement are less obvious, although it is quite unlikely that 
either the US or Russia—the newest members of the ASEAN+8 grouping—are likely to want to 
participate. Should Timor Leste accede to ASEAN, then this small island state will almost 
certainly also sign up for most of ASEAN’s protocols, including presumably the CMIM. Should 
India join the CMIM, the possibility of other South Asian nations joining would also be 
significantly enhanced. There could be a snowballing effect following the initial enlargement of 
membership of the CMIM. 
 
Although these reforms are desirable, they are not all equally important. If AMRO could gain 
credibility as an independent surveillance unit, then the small size and membership of the CMIM 
would be less binding constraints. After all, even the IMF has relied upon other partners to fund 
Strengthening AMRO’s Credibility   
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bailouts, first in Asia in 1997/98 and currently in Europe. But in both cases the IMF led the 
rescue efforts and set the terms, and this is what matters. AMRO needs to be able to do the 
same. In short, the amount of funds available needs not be a constraint if the capacity to lead a 
rescue exists. In fact, even if the funds were sufficient, there may be merit in a joint rescue 
program involving collaboration amongst other regional and\or non-regional partners. In this 
respect, it is also worth emphasizing that leading a rescue does not entail excluding the IMF, for 
instance, from participating in setting the terms either; it means having the final say, but not the 
only say. 
 
Ultimately, the CMIM must rely more on its own independent assessment to make lending 
decisions—including both in the amount of loans and any conditionality. At present, AMRO still 
lacks the research capacity, human resources, experience, and the institutional setup to 
effectively serve as a professional secretariat to the CMIM. Although AMRO has made progress 
as a relatively new institution, it still functions mostly as a research office for the CMIM, and 
undertakes a basic surveillance function producing macroeconomic and financial monitoring 
assessments. The current ERPD process,8
 
 at which these assessments are presented, is still 
largely a venue for information sharing at best, and a “beauty contest” at worst, with weak peer 
review or policy coordination (Menon 2012). Unless there is a commitment from member 
countries to significantly increase the resourcing of AMRO so that it may strengthen and expand 
its functions, it is unlikely that it will be able to perform its role as an independent and credible 
surveillance unit, let alone a full functioning secretariat for the CMIM 
Although the Joint Statement of the 15th AFMM re-emphasized the importance of strengthening 
AMRO’s role as an “independent regional surveillance unit in contributing to effective monitoring 
and analysis of regional economies, early detection of risks, swift implementation of remedial 
actions, and effective decision-making of the CMIM,” they could propose little more than further 
collaboration and cooperation with the IMF, ADB, and World Bank.  Although they requested the 
deputies to find out how AMRO’s organizational capacity could be strengthened at the Deputies 
Meeting in November 2012, the fact that they never even alluded to the possibility of any 
increase in funding is telling. 
  
If these are the reforms that the CMIM and AMRO need to undertake in order to become 
effective, then there is also at least one thing that it should not do. It should avoid the temptation 
to give in to mission creep and instead focus on core functions, particularly surveillance 
activities. For instance, recent suggestions that AMRO should introduce a Regional Monetary 
Unit (Kawai 2010, Rana et al. 2012) are premature and could derail the building of core 
competencies. There is room for specialization and collaboration, and more specialized 
functions such as these should be left to other institutions. 
 
Although the CMIM was established with the aim of supplementing existing international 
financial arrangements, ultimately its goal should be to lead any rescue package in the region.  
As Henning (2011) and ADB (2011) correctly note, the IMF is still unique among crisis-fighting 
facilities in the universality and diversity of its membership, and its resources and experience 
with designing rescue packages; itremains the final resort in efforts to combat regional 
contagion. In its current incarnation, it also seems unlikely that the CMIM alone will be adequate 
to address a region-wide systemic financial crisis. An optimistic scenario would see the CMIM 
                                               
8 The ERPD is carried out in two stages. The first stage is an unofficial forum where surveillance reports (from 
AMRO, ADB, and the IMF) are presented to the AFDM+3. It is held bi-annually in March or April and November. The 
second stage focuses more on issues related to policy involving the AFMM+3, and is conducted once a year on the 
sidelines of the ADB Annual Meeting. 
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evolve toward a regime in which the roles are reversed over time, with the CMIM defining 
conditionality and the IMF being a complementary source of funds. If this optimism is to be 
justified, then ASEAN+3 must commit to AMRO’s development through a substantial increase in 
its resources. So far, there is little evidence of a commitment of the required magnitude. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Financial safety nets in Asia take four forms. The first line of defense has always been national 
holdings of foreign exchange reserves. The second, and most popular of late, is a bilateral 
foreign currency swap arrangement. The third is regional safety nets, such as the subject of this 
paper, an expanded CMIM. In addition there is the global lender of last resort, the IMF. The 
importance of strengthening regional financial safety nets grew from the AFC of 1997/98. When 
the AFC struck, the ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA) was basically too small (US$200 million) 
to be of any use. There was no alternative but to turn to the IMF for the massive bailouts 
required. The IMF grew extremely unpopular, however, not just for the prescribed bitter 
medicine, but because it misdiagnosed the problems—a fact that it later acknowledged. There 
was a resurgence of nationalist sentiment that quickly grew regional.  
 
This led to the birth of the CMI in 2000, which expanded the bilateral swaps of the ASA, both in 
terms of size and membership, to include the PRC, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. The 
CMI’s first test came in September 2008 when, following the Lehman Brothers collapse, short-
term capital quickly exited emerging economies. But when the GFC hit, members of the CMI 
that required liquidity support did not turn to it but instead rushed to secure bilateral swaps with 
the US, PRC, Japan, Australia, and the multilaterals. Once again, the regional financial safety 
net had failed its members. This brought about another significant change when, in 2009, the 
CMI was multilateralized to become the CMIM, with the many swap lines now governed by a 
single agreement.  
 
More recently, the CMIM has been doubled to US$240 billion, the share available without an 
IMF program was increased to 30% (and possibly 40% in 2014), and a precautionary line of 
credit similar to that of the IMF’s was introduced. Its surveillance unit, AMRO, has also been up 
and running in Singapore since 2011. All of this is impressive, and does reflect progress with 
Asia’s financial safety nets. But is it enough? Is it likely that the CMIM will be called upon when 
the next crisis strikes? Unfortunately, the CMIM still appears unusable, either as a co-financing 
facility in tandem with the IMF or as a stand-alone alternative. There are a number of reasons, 
and therefore an equal number of issues, that need to be addressed to make it viable.  
 
First, as a reserve-pooling arrangement, there is no fund but a series of promises. This is not a 
problem per se but it is when there are no rapid response procedures to handle a fast-
developing financial emergency. Unless these procedures are streamlined, the CMIM is unlikely 
to be called upon even as a co-financing facility when bilateral swaps or even the IMF may be 
able to deliver the needed liquidity in the required time. If the CMIM is to be a real substitute for 
the IMF and serve its role as a true regional alternative, then the size of the fund, or the portion 
de-linked from an IMF program, also needs to be increased substantially. Membership would 
also need to increase beyond ASEAN+3, not just to bolster the size of the fund, but also to 
diversify it. But if AMRO could gain sufficient credibility, then the small size and membership of 
the CMIM would be less binding constraints. After all, even the IMF relied upon other partners to 
fund the bailouts in Asia in 1997/98 and in Europe today. In both of these scenarios, the IMF led 
the rescue and set the terms, and this is what matters. AMRO needs to be able to do the same.  
 
Without these changes, and in a region still wary of the IMF stigma, ASEAN+3 is unlikely to turn 
to the CMIM as a co-financier or a substitute, which explains why countries continue to take the 
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high-cost mercantilist route of self-insurance through excessive holdings of foreign exchange 
reserves, or why they continue to pursue bilateral swaps separately, often with other CMIM 
members. In fact, BSAs are quickly becoming the main instrument in Asia’s financial safety net. 
Furthermore, shifting national reserves to a regional fund that is unlikely to be used could 
actually be counter-productive as it weakens a country’s first line of defense. Although 
ASEAN+3 may appear to have a co-financing facility with the IMF in the CMIM, it is not a 
useable one. If it wants its own regional safety net, then it has a long way to go. How long is still 
unclear, but hopefully it can be made workable before, rather than because of, the next crisis. 
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Table 1: Swap Arrangements under the Chiang Mai Initiative  
(US$ billion, as of December 2008) 
 
              To 
 From PRC Japan 
Rep. of 
Korea Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Total 
PRC  3.0 4.0 4.0 1.5 2.0  2.0 16.5 
Japan 3.0  13.0 6.0 1.0 6.0 3.0 6.0 38.0 
Rep. of Korea 4.0 8.0  2.0 1.5 2.0  1.0 18.5 
Indonesia   2.0      2.0 
Malaysia   1.5      1.5 
Philippines  0.5 2.0      2.5 
Singapore  1.0       1.0 
Thailand  3.0 1.0     .. 4.0 
Cambodia         0.0 
Lao PDR         0.0 
Myanmar         0.0 
Viet Nam         0.0 
Sub-total 7.0 15.5 23.5 12.0 4.0 10.0 3.0 9.0 84.0 
 ASEAN Swap Agreement (ASA, among the 10 ASEAN countries) 2.0 
 TOTAL 86.0 
ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic.  
Source: Elaborations based on Japan's Ministry of Finance website. Available at 
http://www.mof.go.jp/english/index.htm. Accessed in February 2009. 
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Table 2: Contributions, Borrowing Multipliers, and Voting Power under the CMIM 
 
Countries 
 
Financial 
Contribution 
(US$ billion) 
 
Share (%) Purchasing 
Multiple 
 
Maximum 
Swap 
Amount 
(US$ billion) 
 
Basic 
Votes 
 
Votes Based 
on 
Contribution 
Voting Power 
 
Votes % 
Plus Three 192.00 80.00  117.30 9.6 192.00 201.6 71.59 
PRC PRC 
(excl. 
Hong 
Kong, 
China) 76.8 
68.4 
32.0 
28.5 0.5 34.2 3.2 68.4 71.6 25.43 
 Hong 
Kong, 
China 
8.4 3.5 2.5 6.3 0.0 8.4 8.4 2.98 
Japan 76.80 32.00 0.5 38.40 3.20 76.80 80.00 28.41 
Rep. Of Korea 38.40 16.00 1 38.40 3.20 38.40 41.60 14.77 
ASEAN 48.00 20.00  126.20 32.00 48.000 80.00 28.41 
Indonesia 9.104 3.793 2.5 22.76 3.20 9.104 12.304 4.369 
Thailand 9.104 3.793 2.5 22.76 3.20 9.104 12.304 4.369 
Malaysia 9.104 3.793 2.5 22.76 3.20 9.104 12.304 4.369 
Singapore 9.104 3.793 2.5 22.76 3.20 9.104 12.304 4.369 
Philippines 9.104 3.793 2.5 22.76 3.20 9.104 12.304 4.369 
Viet Nam 2.00 0.833 5 10.00 3.20 2.00 5.20 1.847 
Cambodia 0.24 0.100 5 1.20 3.20 0.24 3.44 1.222 
Myanmar 0.12 0.050 5 0.60 3.20 0.12 3.32 1.179 
Brunei 0.06 0.025 5 0.30 3.20 0.06 3.26 1.158 
Lao PDR 0.06 0.025 5 0.30 3.20 0.06 3.26 1.158 
Total 240.00 100.00  243.50 41.60 240.00 281.60 100.00 
ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic. 
Source: The Joint Statement of the 15th ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting. 2012. 3 May. Manila, Philippines. 
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Table 3: Regional Safety Nets and Financing Mechanisms—Salient Features  
 
 Year 
Established 
Purpose Resources Members Functions Instruments Decision-Making 
and 
Governance 
 
Link to IMF Recent 
Activity 
Multilateralized 
Chiang Mai 
Initiative 
(CMIM) 
 2000 Address short-term 
liquidity and balance 
of payments 
difficulties in the 
region and 
supplement the 
existing multilateral 
financial 
arrangements.  
US$240 billion. 
Members commit to 
provide financial 
support within the 
agreed amount of 
contribution. Funds 
are transferred from 
central banks and 
monetary authorities 
only when a request 
for drawing is made.  
Association 
of 
Southeast 
Asian 
Nations 
(ASEAN) 
plus the 
People’s 
Republic of 
China 
(PRC), 
Japan, and 
Republic of 
Korea 
Lending and 
surveillance 
(through the 
ASEAN+3 
Macroeconomic 
Research 
Office [AMRO]) 
Members swap 
their local 
currencies with 
US dollars up to 
a 
multiple of their 
contributions to 
the scheme. The 
90-day swaps 
can be renewed 
up to seven 
times. 
Decisions on 
drawings made by 
two-thirds majority 
at the Executive 
Level Decision-
Making Body, 
consisting of deputy 
level 
representatives of 
the ASEAN+3 
Finance Ministries 
and Central Banks 
and the Monetary 
Authority of Hong 
Kong Special 
Administrative 
Region. Voting 
power is distributed 
to members 
according to the 
amount of 
contribution, 
supplemented by 
basic votes 
allocated equally. 
 
Initially, a 
country could 
draw up to 20% 
of its quota 
without being 
subject to IMF 
conditionality. 
This amount 
was increased to 
30% in 2012 and 
potentially will 
be increased 
again to 40% in 
2014. Drawing 
of the remaining 
amount is 
conditional on 
the existence of 
an IMF-
supported 
program. 
None  
Arab Monetary 
Fund (AMF) 
1976 Broad, including 
correct balance-of-
payments 
disequilibria, support  
structural reforms 
in private financing 
US$2.7 billion. The 
AMF may borrow 
from member 
countries, Arab and 
foreign monetary 
and financial 
22 Arab 
countries in 
North 
Africa and 
Middle 
East 
Lending Mix of six lending 
facilities to 
address both 
short-term 
liquidity problems 
and medium-term 
Executive Board 
composed of the 
chairman and eight 
members elected 
by the Board of 
Governors. Two-
Access to 
ordinary loan 
facility must be 
accompanied by 
an IMF program. 
Four new 
loans in 2010 
amounting to 
US$548 
million, the 
highest level 
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and banking, and 
promote exchange 
rate stability. 
institutions, and 
markets, and can 
issue securities. 
structural 
problems, 
including an 
unconditional 
automatic loan 
facility, and an 
ordinary loan 
facility tied to an 
IMF program. 
 
thirds majority 
required for a 
quorum. 
of lending in 
the past 2 
decades.  
Latin American 
Reserve Fund 
(FLAR)  
1991 (as 
successor to 
the Andean 
Reserve 
Fund) 
Support member 
countries’ balance of 
payments through 
credit and 
guarantees. 
US$2.34 billion. 
FLAR has an AA 
composite credit 
rating.  
Bolivia, 
Colombia, 
Ecuador, 
Costa 
Rica, Peru, 
Uruguay, 
and 
Venezuela 
Lending and 
surveillance  
Five types of 
lending 
instruments: (i) 
balance of 
payments credit, 
(ii) foreign debt 
restructuring of 
central 
banks, (iii) 
liquidity credit, 
(iv) contingent 
credit,  and (v) 
treasury credit 
  
Each member 
country has the 
same voting power 
(one vote) 
irrespective of their 
paid-in capital. 
Decisions are made 
by a three-fourths 
majority. 
No official links, 
although FLAR 
shares 
information with 
IMF unofficially  
Balance of 
payments 
loan to 
Ecuador in 
2009. 
Historically, 
FLAR has 
been relevant 
particularly 
for the 
smaller 
member 
countries.   
North American 
Framework 
Agreement 
 1994 Provide short-term 
liquidity support  
US$9 billion United 
States, 
Canada, 
and Mexico 
  
Lending  Two-way bilateral 
central bank 
swaps for 90-
days, renewable 
up to 1 year  
Disbursal only 
requires bilateral 
agreement between 
two participating 
countries. 
US Treasury 
requires letter 
from IMF 
Managing 
Director  
None  
European 
Financial 
Stabilization 
Mechanism 
(EFSM) 
 2010 Provide external 
financial assistance 
to a member state 
experiencing, or 
seriously threatened 
with, a severe 
economic and 
financial disturbance 
caused by 
exceptional 
€60 billion. Funding 
is obtained by 
issuing own 
instruments in 
euros. The 
maximum financing 
capacity of 
the EFSM is €60 
billion and is backed 
by an EU budget 
All EU 
members 
Lending  Loans and credit 
lines. Amount, 
average duration 
(normally about 
5 years), and 
disbursement 
terms of 
a loan or credit 
line are decided 
by the Council, 
Financial 
assistance is 
granted by a 
decision by the 
Council, acting by a 
qualified majority on 
a proposal from the 
Commission. Policy 
conditionality  is 
defined by the 
While legally the 
EFSM allows 
financing solely 
by the EU, the 
ECOFIN 
Council has 
explicitly stated 
that activation 
would only be in 
the context of a 
Activated for 
Ireland 
(2010) and 
Portugal 
(2011)  
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circumstances 
beyond such 
member state’s 
control. 
guarantee. based on funding 
conditions. 
Commission in 
consultation with 
the European 
Central Bank (ECB) 
and spelled out in a 
memorandum of 
understanding 
(MoU). The 
Commission is 
delegated the 
authority to monitor 
the program and 
approve 
disbursements. 
ECB is involved in 
program 
design and 
monitoring, and as 
a paying agent. 
 
joint EU–IMF 
program. 
European 
Financial 
Stability Facility 
(EFSF)  
 2010  Preserve financial 
stability of Europe’s 
monetary union by 
providing 
temporary 
assistance to 
eurozone member 
states in difficulties, 
i.e., unable to borrow 
in markets at 
acceptable rates, 
caused by 
exceptional 
circumstances 
beyond such 
member state’s 
control. 
€ 440 billion. 
Funding is obtained 
by issuing own debt 
instruments or by 
entering into other 
financing 
arrangements with 
financial and 
monetary 
institutions. 
Guarantees by 
eurozone member 
states to the EFSF 
are on a pro rata 
basis, in 
accordance with 
their share in the 
paid-up capital of 
the European 
All 
members 
of 
eurozone 
Lending  Loans and bond 
purchases 
through the 
primary market. 
Funding 
instruments 
under the EFSF 
are expected to 
have the same 
financial 
profile as the 
related loans but 
the guarantors 
may permit EFSF 
to use a degree 
of funding 
flexibility with 
regard to the 
currency, timing, 
Key decisions 
under the EFSF 
Framework 
agreement are 
reserved to 
eurozone member 
states and 
generally require 
unanimity, including 
the decision to 
approve loan facility 
agreements and 
disbursements 
under such 
agreements. The 
ECB is involved in 
program 
design and 
monitoring, 
The framework 
agreement 
establishes that 
financial support 
by the EFSF 
is to be provided 
in conjunction 
with the IMF and 
subject to 
conditionality set 
out in an MoU 
negotiated 
in liaison with 
the IMF and the 
ECB. The IMF 
provided co-
financing for 
Ireland, 
Portugal, and 
Activated for 
Ireland 
(2010),   
Portugal 
(2011), and 
Greece 
(2011) 
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Central Bank (ECB) interest rate 
base, and 
maturity of the 
funding 
instruments. 
 
and as paying 
agent. 
Greece 
programs.  
European 
Stability 
Mechanism 
(ESM)  
Entry into 
force on 
July 2012  
Permanent crisis 
management 
mechanism to 
safeguard financial 
stability in the 
eurozone as a 
whole, replacing 
temporary solutions 
such as the EFSM 
and the EFSF 
 
€500 billion All 
members 
of 
eurozone 
Lending  Assistance 
will 
predominantly 
take the form of 
loans, known as 
ESM stability 
support (ESS). 
ESS will be 
conditional on 
agreement to and 
compliance with 
a strict 
macroeconomic 
adjustment 
program. The 
maturity of the 
ESS loans will 
depend on the 
nature of the 
imbalances and 
the beneficiary 
country’s 
prospects of 
regaining access 
to financial 
markets. 
Key decisions in 
relation to the 
ESM will be taken 
by its Board of 
Governors. A 
second decision-
making body, the 
Board of Directors, 
will be responsible 
for specific tasks 
delegated by the 
Board of 
Governors. ECB 
involved in 
conducting debt 
sustainability 
analysis, program 
design and 
monitoring, and as 
paying agent. 
ESM financial 
assistance will 
only be activated 
upon receipt by 
the Eurogroup 
and ECOFIN 
Presidents, and 
the Managing 
Director of the 
IMF, of a 
request from a 
euro area 
country. 
Following this 
request, the IMF 
will be involved 
in assessing 
whether there is 
a risk to the 
financial stability 
of the euro area 
as a whole, 
conducting debt 
sustainability 
analysis, 
program design, 
negotiation and 
monitoring. 
 
None  
Source: Authors’ compilation drawing upon information from IMF (2010a), Arab Monetary Fund (2011), ECB (2011), Lamberte and Morgan (2012), and 
Park (2011).    
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Table 4: Bilateral Swap Agreements among ASEAN+3 Countries 
 
Country Partner Country Amount Effectivity 
 
Japan Rep. of Korea US$30 billion won-to-yen swap  
Additional US$30 billion dollar-
to-local currency swap 
Oct 2011–Oct 2012 (1 year) 
Philippines  Philippines: US$6 billion from 
Japan 
Japan: US$500 million from the 
Philippines 
May 2012–May 2015 (3 years) 
Rep. of 
Korea  
Japan  US$30 billion won-to-yen swap  
Additional US$30 billion dollar-
to-local currency swap 
Oct 2011–Oct 2012 (1 year) 
PRC US$56 billion Oct 2011–Oct 2014 (3 years) 
People’s 
Rep. of China 
Rep. of Korea US$56 billion Oct 2011–Oct 2014 (3 years) 
Hong Kong, China  US$63 billion  Nov 2011–Nov 2014 (3 years) 
Malaysia  US$28.6 billion  Feb 2012–Feb 2015 (3 years) 
Singapore US$22.12 billion  July 2010–July 2013 (3 years) 
Thailand  US$11 billion  Dec 2011–Dec 2014 (3 years) 
 
Source: Bank of Japan website. 
http://www.boj.or.jp/en/intl_finance/cooperate/index.htm/ 
ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.  ROK Expands Currency Swap with Japan and China.    
http://news.mofat.go.kr/enewspaper/articleview.php?master=&aid=3974&ssid=24&mvid=1219 
Reuters. Philippines Renews US$6 Billion Swap Deal with Japan, Gets Korean Loan. 4 May 2012. 
http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFBRE8430M520120504 
Centralbanking.com. Malaysia and China Extend Currency Swap Arrangement. 8 Feb 2012. 
http://www.centralbanking.com/central-banking/news/2144895/malaysia-china-extend-currency-swap-
arrangement 
Bloomberg News. China, Hong Kong Expand Currency-Swap Pact to US$63 Billion. 22 Nov 2011. 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-11-22/china-hong-kong-expand-currency-swap-pact-to-63-
billion.html 
Bangkok Post. China, Govt. Sign Currency Swap Deal. 23 Dec 2011. 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asia/272071/china-govt-sign-currency-swap-deal 
China Daily. China Signs Currency Swap Pact with Singapore. 23 July 2010. 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-07/23/content_11043563.htm 
MNI Deutsche Boerse Group. China Data Table: PBOC Currency Swap Agreements. 26 June 2012. 
https://mninews.deutsche-boerse.com/content/china-data-table-pboc-currency-swap-agreements-2 
 
 
 
Table 5: Bilateral Swap Agreements among ASEAN+3 Countries (up for renegotiation)   
 
Country Partner Country Amount Year Last BSA Signed 
 
Japan Indonesia US$12 billion  2009, but under the CMI  
Rep. of 
Korea  
Philippines US$2 billion  2008 
People’s 
Rep. of China 
Indonesia US$16 billion 2009    
Philippines  US$2 billion  2007 
 
BSA = bilateral swap agreement, CMI = Chang Mai Initiative.  
Source: Bank of Japan website. 
http://www.boj.or.jp/en/intl_finance/cooperate/index.htm/ 
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MNI Deutsche Boerse Group. China Data Table: PBOC Currency Swap Agreements. 26 June 2012. 
https://mninews.deutsche-boerse.com/content/china-data-table-pboc-currency-swap-agreements-2 
The Standard. Swap pool to hit USUS$120b. 23 Feb 2009. 
http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?pp_cat=5&art_id=78611&con_type=1&d_str=20090223 
Manila Bulletin. BSP Reviews Bilateral Swap Arrangements. 28 May 2012.  
http://mb.com.ph/node/360671/b 
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Table 6: Total Reserves Minus Gold among CMIM Countries (latest available data)  
 
Country Total Reserves  
(current US$ million) 
 
As of 
 
Brunei Darussalam                         1,693    Aug 2011 
Cambodia                         3,640    Feb 2012 
Hong Kong, China                     294,493    Mar 2012 
China, People’s Rep. of                   3,326,602    Mar 2012 
Indonesia                     106,611    Mar 2012 
Japan                   1,248,875    Apr 2012 
Korea, Republic of                     313,801     Mar 2012 
Lao PDR                            703 Dec 2010 
Malaysia                     133,991    Apr 2012 
Myanmar                         6,732    Sep 2011 
Philippines                       65,685    Mar 2012 
Singapore                     243,582    Mar 2012 
Thailand                     170,729    Apr 2012 
Viet Nam                       14,815    Oct 2011 
Total                   5,931,952     
 
Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic. 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics. 
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